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A B S T R A C T
This Habermasian qualitative study considers the nature and extent of accounting and
austerity colonisation in the context of widening arts engagement in England in a period of
ﬁnancial austerity. It also explores some of the key impacts of austerity and accounting
monitoring and how arts organisations coped with them. The ﬁndings suggest that the
discourses of accounting and austerity were associated with a variety of forms of
colonisation and limited resistance along a continuum. The discourse of austerity was
portrayed as much more problematic and colonising than the extensive accounting
monitoring which was taken for granted. The discourses and practices of austerity were
implicated in morally ambiguous and role-conﬂicted organisational behaviour suggesting
sublimated legitimation crisis tendencies but there was no evidence of widespread
Habermasian motivation crisis in relation to austerity or accounting monitoring. Some
organisational members responded actively to accounting colonisation, and as a
reorientation or reversal of colonisation, created transformations of accounting through
a range of narrative and visual reporting methods. Their evaluation of such qualitative data
revealed an expression of autonomy in the face of pathological accounting colonisation,
whilst paradoxically creating self-challenging monitoring procedures.
ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
This study adopts a Habermasian approach to explore accounting colonisation and austerity in three arts organisations in
England. Art is important for Habermasians because it may potentially enhance the lifeworld at both individual and societal
level. Habermas (2007) argues for art that reﬂects and arises from a more democratic society. He champions post-auratic,
authentic art that takes the form of a subversive counterculture through challenging repressive economic and political
systems (Habermas, 2007). The U.K. Labour Government (1997–2010) pursued a new policy of widening arts engagement
which, although not discursively agreed, is of interest from a Habermasian perspective because it may potentially enhance
the lifeworld, if the latter is not excessively burdened with administrative systems and technologies such as accounting. The
Labour government emphasized that the arts could potentially enhance social inclusion and wellbeing through widening
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H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53 35ngagement, in addition to playing an instrumental role in contributing to economic development (Selwood, 2002). They
ontinued the intensiﬁcation of accounting techniques (including performance monitoring and efﬁciency measures) in arts
rganisations that had been developed by the Conservative government since the 1980s and has been described as New
ublic Management (Crossick & Kaszynska, 2014). This phenomenon has been observed in many Western countries in a
ariety of public and private sector organisations (see Hood, 1995). The Labour government attempted to measure the
ffectiveness of funding in enhancing social inclusion and developing the economy, in part to try to justify public expenditure
n the policy of widening engagement (Crossick & Kaszynska, 2014). Gradually, the Labour government became sceptical of
e possibility of establishing a link between arts activities and social policy objectives and, responding to criticisms of
rgets from within the cultural sector, they indicated that they would try to reduce the number of performance indicators
r arts organisations and increase the emphasis on trust, as evidenced in the McMaster (2008) report (Selwood, 2002;
ewison, 2011; Oakes & Oakes, 2012). Nevertheless, performance measurement remained prominent (Crossick & Kaszynska,
014).
From 2010 onwards, the incoming Coalition government attempted rapid deﬁcit reduction (Painter, 2012) presented as a
esponse to the 2008 ﬁnancial crash, and it promoted market solutions to reductions in arts funding, encouraging an increase
 fundraising and philanthropy, whilst continuing to emphasize the development of arts engagement in communities, but
ith a reduced level of funding. Arts Council England reﬂected the government policy of widening engagement in its 2012
n year strategic framework entitled ‘Achieving great art for everyone’. Another strand of Coalition government arts policy
cluded applying the concept of the “Big Society” which promoted the extension of volunteering and charitable giving
y the general public to the arts. More recently, in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, accounting and other managerial
usiness techniques were promoted by government, funders and consultants as signiﬁcant methods for coping with
eductions to arts budgets. For example, it was suggested in the Royce Report (2011) that arts organisations should become
ore like businesses, extending their use of accounting to reduce the dependency of the arts sector on the state, to weed
ut failing organisations and to justify public expenditure and advocate for the “successful” arts organisations. In relation to
dvocacy, Knell and Taylor (2011, p. 18) in their pamphlet (promoted on the Arts Council England 2012 website) argue for an
tensiﬁcation of quantiﬁed monitoring to make a case for the ‘spectrum’ of arts activities. Accounting is seen as
portant by government to try to demonstrate successful arts policies to encourage re-election and to attempt to maintain
ontrol in arts organisations because government has to ‘take all the collateral damage’ if things go wrong (Selwood, 2002, p.
9).
The intensiﬁcation of accounting in the arts sector has links with concepts of Accountingization (Kurunmaki, Lapsley, &
elia, 2003) and ﬁnancialization observed by Carter and Mueller (2006) and Cushen (2013). It has been referred to as an
xample of the related concept of the Audit Society (Power, 2000) by Hewison (2011). However, little attention has been paid
 analysing and theorising the complex roles of accounting in arts organisations. A notable exception is Oakes, Townley, and
ooper (1998). Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, they provide an important study of business planning in the
eengineering of a provincial government department in Canada responsible for a range of cultural institutions (including
everal large museums). Zan, Blackstock, Cerutti, and Mayer (2000), observe a need for micro studies of arts organisations
xamining the effects of increasing pressures to demonstrate economic efﬁciency and value for money. The current study
esponds to the relative neglect of such studies.
A number of seminal studies in the ﬁeld of critical accounting provide a framework for applying Habermas’ theory of
olonisation of the lifeworld to the intensiﬁcation of accounting in the public sector (e.g. Broadbent, Laughlin, & Read, 1991;
ower & Laughlin,1996; Broadbent & Laughlin,1997; Dillard, 2002). According to Laughlin (2007) and Oakes et al. (1998), the
egree of colonisation or resistance is contingent upon context. Thus, in empirical studies of the Church of England, schools
nd GP practices in England, Broadbent and Laughlin observed ﬁrst order change or ‘resistance to steering requirements
rough internal absorption’ where interpretive schemes (the sacred core) ‘are not affected’ (Laughlin, 2007, p. 283). In
ontrast, in their study of cultural institutions, Oakes et al. (1998) reported that managers actively engaged with the
troduction of business planning ‘rather than using strategies of resistance, decoupling, or ceremonial change’ (p. 284), and
at even when they tried to protect their core identity, ‘the act of adopting these practices’ ‘may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence’ the
ore values ‘and identity of the ﬁeld’ (p. 286). We develop understanding of accounting colonisation in the context of extreme
usterity, drawing particularly on concepts of Habermasian colonisation and resistance from Dillard (2002), Dillard and
uthas (2006), Oakes and Berry (2009) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2013). The current study adopts Dillard’s (2002) call to
onsider the degree of colonisation, rather than assessing whether accounting has colonised or not colonised in an absolute
ense and we identify a continuum of accounting and austerity colonisation. Thus, a key objective of the study is to add to
urrent knowledge regarding the subtlety of accounting colonisation, drawing attention to nuanced aspects through which
e degree of accounting colonisation may be recognised. In addition, the context of the study in a period of unusually severe
nancial austerity allows us to compare perceptions of accounting colonisation relating to data collection and monitoring
ith perceptions of austerity and funding reductions. We also consider whether austerity precipitates Habermas’ crises, and
ur ﬁndings contribute towards a more general explanation of why long-term motivation crises have not emerged in
dvanced liberal capitalism in the way Habermas (2007) suggests.
Given the historical problems for policy makers in terms of performance measurement and quality evaluation in arts
rganisations (e.g. see Zan, Bonini Baraldi, Ferri, Lusiani, & Mariani, 2012), as well as the complex nature of accounting
olonisation, the paper addresses four issues in the context of austerity. First, we consider some of the key impacts of
usterity and accounting (and how the arts organisations coped with them) through exploring managerial accounts of
36 H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53austerity and accounting monitoring close up in three arts organisations in a city in England. In addition, we include some
further illustrative quotes from two other arts organisations in the discussion. Second, we consider the nature and extent of
accounting and austerity colonisation in arts organisations. This includes developing understanding of the ways in which
accounting and austerity may be implicated in undermining organisational core values or engendering resistance. Third, in
accordance with Habermas’ (2007) legitimation crisis theory, we consider whether ﬁnancial crisis was accompanied by
rationality, legitimation and/or motivation crises in regard to accounting. Fourth, we consider the extent to which the
discourses and practices of austerity and monitoring helped or hindered promotion of the activities (including widening
engagement) of the arts organisations studied.
The intensiﬁcation of accounting is not necessarily problematic or undesirable. Orthodox accounting literature suggests
many beneﬁts associated with accounting including enhancing stewardship, control, efﬁciency and effectiveness. However,
in recent decades, critical, in-depth analyses of accounting have observed that the calculative practices and rigorous record
keeping of accounting can have ‘powerful transformative effects’ (Jeacle, 2012, p. 582). For example, Ezzamel, Robson, and
Stapleton (2012) demonstrate that a new budgetary system can create new organizational boundaries. Furthermore,
management accounting can ‘induce individuals to think of themselves as calculating selves’ (Miller, 2001, p. 380) who
assume responsibility as ‘self-regulating’ persons within a constrained environment (Miller, 2001, p. 381).
Critical accounting research has revealed many reasons why the intensiﬁcation of accounting may be more problematic
for organisations and society than the orthodox promises of accounting suggest. For example, Shearer (2002) explains how
the close linkage between orthodox accounting and neo-classical economics means that it typically adopts a rational
decision making model (economic rationality) that privileges self-interest over the interests of others. Similarly, Roberts and
Scapens (1990) observe the disciplinary role of accounting and its links with power such that it may privilege certain
interests over others. Espeland and Sauder (2007, p. 16) note that measurement ‘shapes what we pay attention to, which
things are connected to other things, and how we express sameness and difference’. Thus, through its reductive emphasis on
proﬁt or surplus, percentage return on investment, cost reduction and quantitative performance indicators, accounting
sometimes may have negative implications for what we value and see as important, excluding alternative schemes of value.
Furthermore, the narrow focus of accounting may render self-critique problematic. For example, by capturing and re-
framing ‘organisational self-understandings’, accounting can become insulated ‘from systemic inquiry other than in terms of
technical success or failure’ (Power and Laughlin, 1996, p. 447). Accounting is also difﬁcult to question because it operates as
a symbol of objectivity and rationality which is deceptive in terms of its knowledge claims, allowing it to be implicated in a
false consciousness (Tinker, Merino, & Neimark, 1982).
Given the close links of accounting to repressive economic and political regimes (Catchpowle, Cooper, & Wright, 2004),
accounting often reﬂects and promotes those inequalities. For example, Sikka (2013) observes that wages are reported as an
expense to be avoided in ﬁnancial accounts whereas dividend payments are reported as an appropriation of proﬁt to be
encouraged.Theinﬂuenceof accounting suggests the importance of studying its potentiallycolonising role in arts organisations.
2. Habermasian theoretical framework
There issome academic debate regarding the deﬁnitionof accounting colonisation.Forexample, contrary to Laughlin (2007),
Oakes and Berry (2009) suggest that colonisation does not necessitate changes to interpretive schemes. Thus, if changes are
regularly enacted that are counter to the lifeworld of the organisation, they indicate pathological colonisation even when
changes to interpretive schemes do not occur. In these cases, agents may be coerced, bribed, manipulated or subject to forms of
attrition (from external and internal institutions and groups) to attempt to implement changes that few in the organisation
support. We deﬁne pathological accounting colonisation asthe implication of accountingin harmfulsocietalpractices which are
often, but not always, coercively imposed and do not always result in changes to interpretive schemes.
This study draws on three forms of accounting colonisation identiﬁed by Oakes and Berry (2009): coercive (real and mock
obedience), instrumental (dialogic and devious compliance) and discursive (pathological and benign). Real obedience is
pathological and represents enforced changes to both actions and interpretive schemes that undermine the lifeworld. Mock
obedience results in changes through enforced compliance without changes occurring to interpretive schemes. One example
of mock obedience (observed by Held, 1982, p. 192) is pragmatic acquiescence where individuals conform for ‘comfort’ and
‘security’, believing they have limited options. In the case of dialogic compliance, incentives, bribes and propaganda result in
changes to interpretive schemes. Devious compliance may also be realised through incentives, bribes and propaganda,
although changes to interpretive schemes are unlikely. Discursively pathological colonisation arises from social discourse
where the majority accept change, but there are a small minority of repressed dissenters. Discursively benign colonisation,
on the other hand, arises from Habermasian extensions to democratic processes where changes to accounting practices and
interpretive schemes are amenable to substantive justiﬁcation and are therefore (at least in principle) accepted universally.
In this study, accounting colonisation is seen as part of a continuum involving undesirable, coercive activities of
psychological and physical attrition, with invasive brainwashing at one end of the spectrum through to complete resistance
at the other end of the spectrum. Discursively benign colonisation falls somewhere in the middle and is analogous to
ecological processes of migration and settlement, some of which are relatively harmless. Coercive and instrumental forms of
colonisation are pertinent to our ﬁndings and are discussed in Sections 4–7. In addition, we suggest that it is possible for
organisational actors to be in agreement regarding the usage of accounting, but not recognise its pathologically coercive or
instrumental, colonising impact, thereby demonstrating a condition of false consciousness.
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H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53 37We draw on some aspects of Broadbent and Laughlin’s application of Habermas to assist in interpreting our ﬁndings,
articularly their concepts of resistance. Laughlin (2007, p. 277) describes accounting colonisation as a type of second order
hange that is enforced and not ‘amenable to substantive justiﬁcation’. In the same paper, he notes that ﬁrst order change
volving partial colonisations, absorption or resistance (observed in organisations by Broadbent, 1992 and Broadbent and
aughlin, 1998) is also possible. Laughlin (2007, p. 283) notes that ﬁrst order changes of resistance can prevent
nvironmental disturbances from entering the organisation in the form of ‘rebuttal’ or the changes can be allowed to cross
e organisational boundary, ‘but are handled in such a way that the sacred core is not affected’ which he classiﬁes as
eorientation’. Thus, reorientation invariably leads to reasonably permanent changes to steering media (design archetype)
nd systems ‘but the interpretative schemes remain the same’ (Laughlin, 2007, p. 283). In our interpretation, reorientation
an only result in limited intended changes to steering media and systems, otherwise colonisation occurs rather than
esistance. Indeed, as Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) observe, reorientation through boundary management can easily
ecome colonisation. Identiﬁcation of whether this has occurred becomes an empirical question.
Broadbent and Laughlin (2013, p. 214) subdivide reorientation into ‘reorientation through boundary management’ and
eorientation through absorption’. Reorientation through boundary management can occur where specialist work groups
.g. senior managers) are obliged to implement accounting controls, but they attempt to minimise their impact. For
xample, they may introduce modiﬁed versions of accounting controls that attempt to satisfy the conﬂicting interests of
arious interest groups whilst protecting the interpretive schemes of the organisation from accounting controls. We regard
is as an example of ‘reversal’ of colonisation, acknowledged by Habermas, where the norms of the lifeworld can invade
conomic and bureaucratic systems, and steering media such as accounting (Habermas and Nielsen, 1990, p. 109).
Habermas (2007) predicts that economic crises will arise from inherent contradictions ‘such as the socialized production
f goods and services and the privatization of surplus (proﬁts)’ (Dillard and Yuthas, 2006). This may lead to a
ationality crisis followed by a legitimation crisis as the injustices of the system become more apparent to participants. In
is context, powerful government administrators resort to intensifying bureaucratic arrangements coercively to try to
estore the status of rationality and sustain legitimacy whilst maintaining historic levels of control. They cannot rely on prior
iscursive methods because by this stage participants will have become highly sceptical of such approaches. In this vicious
ircle of mistrust, motivation crisis ensues where participants are no longer willing to support the prevailing social
rrangements. In the current study, in accordance with Habermasian theory, the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 was followed by a
enewed emphasis by government, funders and consultants on the need for accounting to measure the impact of arts
rganisations, despite historical difﬁculties in collecting reliable data and meaningfully measuring social and economic
pact (e.g. see Selwood, 2002). Such an emphasis on accounting rationality can be theorised as an attempt by government
epresentatives to pre-empt crises of rationality, legitimation and motivation on the part of arts organisations that might be
ubjected to funding cuts.
Habermas (2007) describes a contradictory role for the state. On the one hand, the state must be sustained to counter the
otentially self-destructive excesses of capitalism such as social unrest arising from extreme wealth inequalities. On the
ther hand, there is constant pressure to reduce the role of the state from those who are unwilling to pay high taxes to
upport it. This analysis is particularly pertinent to the U.K. arts sector where public funding of the arts is questioned more
an funding for the health service or schools. The Coalition government illustrates the contradictory role of the state in
resenting a ‘curious hybrid of bureaucratic control and market competition’ (Painter, 2012, p. 7). In this context, accounting
dopts a contradictory role in supporting attempts to reduce the cost of the state and in being mobilised to justify public
xpenditure. This contradictory role is apparent in government policy and in documents on the Arts Council website such as
e Royce Report (2011) and Knell and Taylor’s (2011, p. 18) pamphlet, discussed in Section 1. The decisions and power of the
tate are diffuse, arising from multiple institutions (Brunsson, 1989; Miller & Rose, 2010) rather than emanating from a
entral unit. According to Habermas (2007, p. 60), the various bureaucracies are incompletely co-ordinated and their
eﬁcient capacity for . . . planning . . . guarantees the success of organized special interests.’ Furthermore, arts
rganisations are encouraged to be less state-dependent, more entrepreneurial and market-oriented, reﬂecting the
overnmentality described by Miller and Rose (2010). Thus, they appear to be increasingly self-regulated through the
dividual choices and self-actualization of managers and volunteers, yet they are committed to and constrained by a strong
ense of community allegiance. Miller and Rose (2010, p. 53) observe that technologies such as accounting are instrumental
 sustaining such ‘regulated freedom’.
Dillard and Yuthas (2006) characterise accounting colonisation in organisations as a social condition where discursive
teraction and cooperative social action are severely restricted by accounting technologies, preventing agents from moving
wards the future evolution of the lifeworld. For Broadbent and Laughlin (2013), colonisation occurs at the organisational
vel when accounting change hinders the realisation of the values of the majority in an organisation. In this case,
rganisational values must reﬂect discursively formulated societal values. The deﬁnition can be applied to public service
rganisations such as hospitals, GP practices, schools, and arts organisations that are generally regarded as having valid
ocial objectives. The Habermasian lifeworld represents discursively formulated cultural norms and values, and ideally
rovides the basis to legitimise the economic system (Dillard & Yuthas, 2006). However, in our view, the lifeworld is not
erely a set of procedures to enhance the possibility of achieving a just society, it also represents individual and social
mancipation and an enriched life experience. Thus, accounting colonisation can occur at the individual level by helping to
revent the achievement of individual emancipation needs such as work-life balance, and may also support individual
38 H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53repression and exploitation. It can also occur at the organisational level by hindering the realisation of socially worthwhile
objectives.
3. Research design
The ﬁndings from the current study draw primarily on ten transcribed semi-structured interviews of between 60 and
90 min each with eight senior managers in ﬁve major city arts organisations over a 24 month period. Arts organisation 1
presents a wide range of artistic and cultural events including music, dance, literature and live art. It has an art gallery and its
own dedicated widening engagement group. Arts organisation 2 is the main theatre in the City. Arts organisation 3 is a major
music organisation in the city that presents classical music (along with music from other genres) and has its own orchestra.
Arts organisation 4 specialises in new media and artists’ video including widening engagement programmes focussing on a
wide range of community issues. Arts organisation 5 is a large art gallery and is part of a group of galleries with the main
galleries based in London. These organisations were selected because they have made a signiﬁcant contribution to a diversity
of arts and widening engagement for many years. Evidence from transcribed interviews with a funding manager is also
incorporated. The job titles have been altered to preserve anonymity. Organisations 1–3 are discussed in detail as vignettes to
consider the extent of accounting colonisation in each organisation and to understand impacts of austerity in context. They
reveal some interesting context speciﬁc issues that may have resonance for the wider arts sector and they illustrate common
themes observed in the other two large organisations. Some quotes from the other two arts organisations are included in the
discussion as additional supporting evidence. Four of the organisations are regularly funded by Arts Council England and by
the City Council. The ﬁfth organisation receives funding from the Department of Culture Media and Sport and the Arts
Council England. The presentation of the data conforms with qualitative research methods where ‘researchers typically
study a relatively small number of individuals or situations and preserve the individuality of each of these in their
analyses . . . Thus, they are able to understand how events, actions, and meanings are shaped by the unique circumstances in
which these occur’ (Maxwell, 1996, pp. 17–19). Miller and Rose (2010) observe that the state survives by the practices of
individuals whose presence is important in power relations, suggesting a further rationale for our detailed focus on the
interviewee’s comments. In addition, we were concerned to give voice to participants to illustrate the human aspects of
austerity. Separating the discussion from the ﬁndings allows the reader to engage with the evidence and more easily assess
the credibility of the interpretations.
Participants were asked a range of mainly open ended questions relating to widening arts engagement and beneﬁts or
disadvantages of using accounting as a tool to enhance arts engagement. In order to encourage the emergence of themes
about which the researchers were unaware, participants were given the opportunity to discuss issues that they regarded as
important. In this way, issues of austerity and funding were revealed as particularly signiﬁcant for the managers interviewed.
Evidence was also drawn from analysis of documents from Arts Council England’s website. A meeting between arts
organisation representatives and the public was attended, and a meeting between arts organisations and a funder was
attended to enhance contextual awareness. Each interview was analysed by writing a detailed narrative which was shared
between the two interviewers for discussion. The analysis was then revised and summarised. Key ﬁndings were presented in
a report to interviewees for feedback in order to enhance triangulation. The study covers a period of actual and proposed
funding cuts to arts organisations from 2010 to 2012. It focuses on accounting colonisation through the perceptions of senior
arts managers because they have in-depth knowledge of the speciﬁc objectives of their own organisation, the objectives of
the cultural sector more broadly, as well as an understanding of the inﬂuences of varieties of accounting. A critical
constructionist approach informed by Heiner (2002) is adopted. As with many forms of qualitative research, the scale of the
current exploratory study means that the ﬁndings cannot be generalised. However, it is hoped that the ﬁndings have
resonance for the readers and in this way the story may transcend its own origins (Wolcott, 1995).
In this study, accounting refers particularly to monitoring which was revealed to be prominent in the arts sector. For
analytical purposes, we treat funding and austerity as separate concepts from accounting monitoring. However, we
recognise that they were connected because, for example, the results of monitoring were presented in ofﬁcial documents as
inﬂuencing funding decisions. We conceptualised a complete pathological accounting colonisation in order to consider the
nature and extent of accounting and austerity colonisation in arts organisations. This colonisation would include the
following characteristics: artworks losing authentic meaning, artworks losing diversity, loss of artworks that question or
challenge in an authentic way, loss of authentic widening engagement projects, loss of authentic innovation and
experimentation, and loss of personal enrichment for artists. These characteristics would be associated with extensive (non-
discursively formulated) accounting bureaucracy that diverts attention from promoting quality arts and fosters negative
aspects of target setting (e.g. working to narrow objectives at the expense of important social values). In addition,
pathological accounting colonisation could be characterised by funding cuts resulting in changes that impoverish art
activities and interpretive schemes. Such pathological accounting colonisation includes widespread economic rationality
and accounting logic which is ‘the belief that it is possible to evaluate the use of ﬁnancial transactions through the outputs or
outcomes achieved and that these can be assessed, invariably in measurable form’ (Laughlin, 2007, p. 277). Whilst we
acknowledge that some forms of commercialisation can be positive for the arts, pathological accounting colonisation can be
associated with a form of commercialisation that may foster poor quality arts. The current paper continues by reporting key
ﬁndings and discussing funding and monitoring issues for arts organisations 1–3 in turn. This is followed by discussion and
conclusions.
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.1. Background
The organisation had a large deﬁcit relating to a major capital development of the building. According to the Arts Director
D, hereafter), the inability of the Arts Council to cover all of the debt, as had originally been promised before the credit
runch, had resulted in two redundancies and cuts to the arts programme. The City Council provided a long-term interest
ee loan to cover some of the deﬁcit. Although the building had been refurbished, there was no longer sufﬁcient core funding
 fully utilise the improved building. The widening engagement group had been funded by the Arts Council and the City
ouncil for approximately the last ﬁve years. Other parts of the arts organisation such as the gallery and some performance
rogrammes traditionally relied upon charitable funding. A signiﬁcant income stream also came from creative tenants who
ented parts of the building. In addition, renting spaces for commercial activities and private hire provided further income.
ottery funding had historically been signiﬁcant and it was expected to continue to be a potentially reliable source. Ticket
ales for events did not form a major source of income because many events (including the gallery) were free. The
rganisation is involved in numerous widening engagement projects. An example of one of the projects run by the widening
ngagement group is a relatively long-term project where learning disabled people participate in creating artworks under
e direction of a professional artist. The widening engagement group are also involved in outreach educational programmes
nd arts engagement events for young people. Widening engagement seemed to represent a core value that permeated the
rganisation. The AD explained:
‘Certainly in this organisation the social value of what we do is always very important . . . we’re not an art for art’s sake
venue . . . we’re doing this not as a chore because the Arts Council say you’ve got to do work with excluded kids, but we
do it because actually we enjoy doing it and actually the artists that we work with are artists that have that social sort of
conscience.’
Thus, widening engagement represented part of the lifeworld of the organisation. Although the organisation was very
ommitted to social art, the AD believed that there was a limit to the impact of art in terms of regeneration.
.2. Funding issues: uncertainty, frustration and adaptation
The Labour government was seen by Arts Manager 1 (AM1, hereafter) as having supported widening engagement projects
r a number of years and the threat to funding under the Coalition government represented a signiﬁcant shock to the
idening engagement group. As a consequence of funding cuts, it was reported that there was no public funding available for
 ﬂagship learning disabled project for at least the next six months. The project had enabled some clients to become
igniﬁcantly more independent and able to travel independently for the ﬁrst time. It provided variety from the day centre,
nd clients were concerned they would lose the service. The organisation was seeking interim charitable trust funding but
e uncertainty created anxiety and was described as ‘a real worry’ (AM1).
Financial austerity was regarded as challenging by AM1 due to the dependency of the organisation on other organisations
nd groups such as Education, Health, Social Care and Youth workers. It was felt that changes and cuts to their budgets would
rickle down’ to have a potential impact on the work of the widening engagement group. There was frustration that funding
f organisational partners would be withdrawn, hampering the perceived progress that had been made and potentially
rminating or restricting relationships that had been built up with funding organisations such as the Primary Care Trust and
e Neighbourhood Management Service. This was expressed by AM1 as follows:
‘ . . . we have got a programme that’s totally funded without any arts funding at all . . . you can see that it is going to
potentially change dramatically. Just at the point where you had really been able to . . . show people what’s possible with
the right kind of funding you can make things happen. So it is quite frustrating, but we just have to be ﬂexible enough to
adapt to the next challenge.’
Whilst the quotation above illustrates the sense of frustration felt by AM1 at the threat to widening engagement from
ossible funding cuts, she also expressed a sense of resilience, for example, in the organisation’s resolve to ‘adapt to the next
hallenge’ at ‘a really interesting time’ where there were ‘some opportunities.’ The organisation was presented as running
any different projects, rapidly adapting to changing demands and funding changes by ﬁnding new partners and applying
xisting knowledge to move into new areas such as mental health and art therapy.
AM1 felt that a consequence of funding cuts was that their work would become more focused on specialist areas such as
ental health, rather than on general widening engagement. Thus, projects that represented ‘the icing on the cake’, such as
outh work, would be severely reduced:
‘That’s going to be our policy change, that narrowing down, focusing on what we’re really good at and what we’re really
excited about and where we can make the most impact. And unfortunately that will be at the expense of that wider
programme, which is a real shame because we’ve built up great relationships with youth workers and it’s difﬁcult because
the kids that are involved in the youth centres, a lot of them are in from very deprived backgrounds and haven’t got access
40 H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53to the arts, so you are still going to be missing out on something that could be really important in their lives. But it’s just
the difﬁcult decisions we’re having to make at the moment.’ (AM1)
The concentration on specialist social art projects rather than outreach youth work was described ambiguously. On the
one hand, it was a ‘shame’ to have a reduction in youth projects. On the other hand, the external priorities such as a focus on
specialist social problems were allowed to inﬁltrate the organisation's discourse and were formulated as congruent with the
main aims of the organisation and the funding partners, as indicated in the following: ‘I think that’s where we’re most
excited about that work as well. So it kind of works well all round’ (AM1). Thus, the terminology of austerity and funding cuts
insidiously inﬁltrated the interpretive schemes of organisational members and could be associated with discrimination
between different types of arts activity. Such a pragmatic approach represented a move from the devious compliance of
instrumental colonisation, where compliance is elicited through funding incentives, but interpretive schemes do not change,
towards dialogic compliance where interpretive schemes change. Another example of the inﬁltration of accounting logic was
the way AM1 and the AD described the reduction in youth work as a removal of the ‘icing on the cake’, suggesting that youth
work was treated as a peripheral luxury. Yet from another perspective, such work could be regarded as a core element of
widening engagement. The apparent automatic acceptance of youth work as peripheral indicated the colonisation of dialogic
compliance.
A comment by the AD illustrates how the pressures of funding reductions had to be resisted, suggesting a rebuttal of
accounting colonisation:
‘But where we’re positioned in the centre of the town next to X, we’re conﬁdent that . . . over time we will generate more
funding without going down that route of being entirely commercial because I think that’s the danger that . . . if we got a
McDonald’s in one of our spaces . . . that would probably solve our problems.’
An impression was created of a highly pressurised environment linked to a disciplining funding regime where dedication
and an on-going struggle were required to try to preserve the lifeworld, often by bidding for funds from a variety of partners
that were funded primarily by public funds (through central or local government). We have interpreted such behaviour as
devious compliance because the central or local government funding element incentivised the organisation to undertake
speciﬁc activities desired by the government, often in preference to arguably equally worthy activities where funding was
withdrawn as a form of instrumental colonisation. Furthermore, even in an organisation with a strong lifeworld of widening
access to quality arts, there was evidence of the discourses of economic rationality and accounting logic becoming
normalised in relation to funding constraints. Thus, applying existing knowledge to move into new areas such as mental
health and art therapy was regarded as ‘an economy of scale’ and art for dementia sufferers was described as ‘a growth area’.
The positive tone in the interview with AM1 and the emphasis on ﬂexibility may in part have been intended to demonstrate
that the widening engagement group did not represent the types of visual arts groups singled out in the Royce Report (2011)
as “problematic” because they apparently reject economic values and refuse to accept change. In addition, the organisation
sought to increase its dependence on volunteers, including learning disabled people to compensate for lack of funding.
Whilst volunteering may have many beneﬁts for the volunteers and the organisation, the discourse of austerity forced moral
ambiguity on the organisation which was not articulated as it willingly sought to increase its dependence on volunteers. We
have therefore categorised it as an example of real obedience associated with coercive austerity.
4.3. Extensive and colonising monitoring
The organisation was well versed in applying for funding grants and in demonstrating accountability for the funds
provided. Participation hours and numbers of participants were monitored, KPIs were collected and fortnightly reporting to
the Senior Management Team occurred. Monitoring was reported as extensive by AM1:
‘You can’t just do the social work, you have to record everything that has happened. In an organisation like ours it is very
extensive.’
It was reported by AM1 that the organisation had adapted to the inﬁltration of accounting and it had become naturalised:
‘I think we have probably all gone through the adjustment period of having to deal with it. We are just so used to the
monitoring side of things that it has become part of our general way of working.’
The quotation above suggests that the discourse of new public management was embedded in the organisation,
conforming to government requirements. The AD regarded measurement as a necessity:
‘You can’t just go ahead putting on things because you think they’re having some impact. You’ve got to measure them and
obviously you can measure them ﬁnancially and you can measure them in terms of audience and how effective that
marketing communication was.’
He indicated that accountability was expected and ways of measuring impact were built in at the design stage of projects,
although he believed that there is room for improvement.
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getting better, but it’s still a long way to go. I think the arts have still got a long way to go to, how they properly measure
and evaluate so they can say, here’s the evidence. This is why it was. This is your value for money.’
The AD accepted the need for accounting logic and accountability presenting organisational activities as commodities to
e assessed in terms of demonstrable impact. Thus, the reductionism of accounting seemed to have inﬁltrated the
onsciousness of the AD with minimal questioning.
We could describe the extensive monitoring reported as benign colonisation rather than the instrumental colonisation of
ialogic compliance because it was mainly uncritically accepted as part of the normal way of working and it was not
ortrayed by the organisational members as overly problematic. However, organisational members may have been unaware
f some of the instrumental colonising aspects of accounting, thereby exhibiting false consciousness. In addition, some
rganisational members may have felt that it was futile to highlight any observed limitations of accounting given such
ressure from government and other funders. Since monitoring was incentivised through the funding mechanism and had
ome potentially negative consequences for the organisation, we categorised its uncritical acceptance as an example of
ialogic compliance.
.4. Inappropriate monitoring
This section reveals how organisational members did report a few limitations of accounting monitoring. For example, a
ange of funders (social landlords, Department for Culture Media and Sport and the City Council) were described as more
terested in quantitative data (e.g. ‘ﬁgures and postcodes’) than qualitative data.
‘ . . . the City Council are only interested in how many people came and whether the project enhanced their health and
wellbeing . . . They just want to know how many people’s health and wellbeing it positively affected . . . ’ (AM1)
AM1 acknowledged that the ‘Arts Council and City Council need to be accountable’ and therefore it was important to
entify numbers of participants in order to measure cost per head. On the other hand, AM1 emphasized that organisation 1
as more interested in qualitative data than in quantitative data. Qualitative data was thought to be more useful for
ontinuous improvement and it was seen as more motivating than quantitative monitoring:
‘The monitoring stuff . . . it’s quite nice when you get to the end of the year and you go “yeah we did 21,000 h. We
provided that for people” . . . Our senior management team will set targets around the big indicators like business
numbers, hours of participation provided, so it’s a bit of motivation for us from that point of view. But the [qualitative]
evaluation is deﬁnitely more motivating for us . . . because we are constantly looking to change what we do to make it
better. There’s never a point where you think that’s perfect. We are always looking to say . . . what’s the next thing . . .
that we can support people with, which is why we are moving on to volunteering.’
Both AM1 and the AD suggested that quantitative performance indicators were seen as inappropriate to measure the type
f transformative social art that the organisation developed. The following comment by the AD represents the views
xpressed:
‘How many kids from X did you work with? Well, we work with kids from X, but we might only work with three whose
lives are changed and that is much more important than working with 50 who have a very superﬁcial art experience.’
Quantitative performance indicators were regarded by the AD as much better suited to organisations with signiﬁcant
esources that provide large scale public performances where numbers of attendees at one off performances can be easily
easured. In this context, privileging performance indicators based on numbers of attendees was divisive in favouring large,
ell-resourced, organisations that promoted large scale events. Thus, accounting with its ﬁction of objectivity and neutrality
as implicated in masking a privileging of certain groups and certain types of events over others. We have interpreted this
ole of accounting as eliciting devious compliance because although organisational members accepted the number of
ttendees as a key performance indicator, they voiced some awareness of its limitations, suggesting that interpretive
chemes were not changed.
The concept of monitoring was seen as problematic in the context of learning disabled people because some were likely to
nd it difﬁcult to offer any critical comments and tended to report a uniformly positive experience for every feedback
uestion in a conventional evaluation. The organisational members undertook one to one feedback interviews to try to
vercome the issues associated with conventional evaluation questionnaires. However, AM1 said that this took 15 min per
erson which was obviously time-consuming and costly. In this case, conventional monitoring was resisted and modiﬁed to a
rmat that organisational members felt better suited the context, suggesting a reorientation. In addition, organisation
embers decided not to ask vulnerable minors about their sexuality or ethnicity because it was thought that it would
terfere with relationship building, indicating a rebuttal of this form of monitoring. In general, the predominant acceptance
f accounting monitoring with some criticism suggested an ambiguity towards monitoring characteristic of a climate of
oercive and instrumental forms of accounting.
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The organisation was creative in ﬁnding new accountabilities to supplement the perceived inadequacies of crude,
quantitative performance indicators. Qualitative case studies were reported as useful in demonstrating social impact to meet
the requirements of the funders and could be used to feed into bids for further funded projects. They were seen as important
in identifying some of the life-changing and transformative impacts of the arts engagement projects. For example, case
studies evidenced how, as a result of the learning disabled art project, rather than being house bound and taken to a day
centre, a number of individuals were now able to leave their house and travel independently for the ﬁrst time ‘impacting on
their health potentially’ (AM1). Despite developing alternatives to quantitative monitoring, the monitoring role of
accounting numbers was fairly well embedded in organisation 1. Whilst there was some limited resistance and behavioural
ambiguity, organisation members did not articulate awareness of the broader, negatively colonising potential of accounting
numbers observed in academic literature, suggesting an element of false consciousness.
5. Arts organisation 2
5.1. Background
Widening engagement was very important to the organisation as summed up by Marketing Manager 1 (MM1, hereafter):
‘ . . . we believe everybody should have the opportunity to attend, whatever their background, age, experience, ﬁnancial
situation.’
Key motivations reported to explain the organisation’s widening engagement outreach and education activities were
developing the next generation of theatre goers as a ‘priority’ and transforming ‘aspirations and outlook’. Thus, the
organisation’s lifeworld of developing widening engagement was rooted in pragmatic as well as ethical considerations. The
outreach department had six members of staff and a youth director. The theatre was mainly funded by the Arts Council and
was also very reliant on ticket sales. Additional funding came from neighbourhood management, housing associations and
the Primary Care Trust. Widening engagement activities included writers’ workshops, community outreach projects and
youth theatre. There was to be a new theatre development that would include a dedicated youth and community space.
Pricing was reported as being used to attract outreach participants to become more permanent theatre goers by offering
cheaper tickets relative to other theatres, thus encouraging widening engagement. Furthermore, it was indicated that the
main theatre and the youth theatre often chose productions that were challenging and ‘brave’ and that engagement was not
interpreted as fostering “low-brow” culture for the masses. This strategy may have provided additional justiﬁcation for
widening engagement work in a climate, described by Knell and Taylor (2011), where such work was associated by some
with low-brow art and was therefore seen as less important and less of a funding priority. Despite the attempts to widen
engagement, MM1 observed that there were many communities outside the city centre that were ‘largely very disengaged
from the arts.’
5.2. Uncertainty of funding
Similar to organisation 1, the discourse of funding cuts and austerity was portrayed as more problematic than accounting
monitoring, and it seemed to have the potential to radically undermine the core activities and interpretive schemes of the
organisation. Thus, there was a sense that outreach activities might be at risk, a general feeling of uncertainty, an
appreciation that alternative funding would have to be sought, and a perception that more justiﬁcation for arts engagement
activities would be required. The Labour government was seen as having assisted the development of the arts, even though
not all of its initiatives were regarded as appropriate. However, the uncertainty in austerity associated with the Coalition
government was viewed as a threat to widening engagement.
Marketing Manager 2 (MM2, hereafter) drew attention to several negative effects of austerity, including fuelling internal
conﬂict regarding whose job was the most relevant:
‘It’s as if arts organisation people are ﬁghting amongst themselves internally . . . saying, “Oh, no, your job isn’t as relevant
as this is.”’
5.3. Coping with austerity
Funding cuts emerged during the course of the study, but they were not as severe as for other organisations in the sector.
In response to funding cuts, careful attention was paid to ﬁnancial management, and ticket prices at the higher end were
increased while low end ticket prices were retained in line with the widening engagement objective. Risky productions were
balanced with those that were more likely to guarantee returns and the organisation continued to foster widening
engagement and promote high quality, innovative theatre. Thus, colonisation in the form of excessive commercialisation was
restricted, suggesting resistance as reorientation through boundary management where the core is relatively unaffected.
il
th
2
‘s
s
c
s
s
d
fu
p
ta
d
s
b
m
5
r
r
w
in
p
le
fo
n
a
in
th
p
H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53 43However, the coercive presence of funding cuts did taint core values producing some morally ambiguous behaviour as
lustrated in the next example. Following a government announcement of major cuts to the arts sector, a senior member of
e organisation took part in a panel discussion on a high proﬁle television news programme. The comments of organisation
 were seen as representing the whole sector and the response was described by MM2 as follows.
‘ . . . that was on the day when the Arts Council funding was announced, and we came out of it pretty well, but a fair
amount of our friends, a lot of the companies we work with didn’t, and the message was very much, we understand that
the Arts Council has had to make these cuts . . . but we didn’t want to publicly out ourselves as being, “This is terrible.” It
would have been harmful for our image.’
The organisation decided to underplay the impact of the funding cuts. It took a pragmatic approach on the day when
ome people have had 100% cuts’ and publicly prioritised organisational survival over more general sector concerns. This
uggested a devious compliance linked to ﬁnancial incentives that produce required behaviour. The coercive nature of
olonisation was divisive:
‘It was a difﬁcult position to be in, to be almost talking on behalf of British arts organisations when so many had had cuts,
but that was our choice anyway, that we want to be talking about the future and what we’re going to do.’ (MM2)
The way the tale was told suggested that the organisation experienced some moral ambiguity and guilt for not showing
olidarity with arts organisations that had experienced severe funding cuts. MM2 observed that as a result of funding cuts,
ome small arts organisations with ‘fantastic reputations’, ‘great artistic work’ and ‘great audience ﬁgures’ would be
isbanded, suggesting the divisive nature of the budgetary process. Smaller organisations were seen to be more vulnerable to
nding cuts possibly because ‘they can’t kick up as much of a stink’ (MM2).
The government’s suggestion that philanthropy should be developed as an alternative to public funding was regarded as
roblematic for a number of reasons including lack of wealth in the region, lack of appropriate culture and lack of adequate
x incentives. According to MM2, corporate sponsors had reduced signiﬁcantly since the recession and they could not be
eveloped extensively because their motivation was commercial rather than philanthropic. Nevertheless, corporate
ponsors continued to be sought, suggesting mock obedience. In general, organisation 2 introduced some elements of
udgetary control in response to funding cuts, but the identiﬁcation of a number of negative effects of austerity suggested
ock obedience where interpretive schemes were relatively unchanged.
.4. Extensive monitoring for advocacy
Accounting monitoring had colonised the organisation to the extent that there was one member of staff whose entire job
ole was monitoring audiences and outreach work. Furthermore, MM1 illustrated the signiﬁcant amount of accounting in her
ole, as follows:
‘So there’s quite a lot of numbers in my job. You know there’s a lot of looking at ﬁnancial information from sales as well as
how much we’ve spent as a company.’
Thus, unlike Broadbent and Laughlin’s (1998) ﬁndings, accounting practices and thinking were not contained in specialist
orkgroups, but rather they extended into a number of areas in the organisation.
Similar to organisation 1, monitoring was portrayed in a generally positive light. For example, according to MM1, the
crease in the use of accounting methods since 2004 had allowed the organisation to be more ambitious in its
rogramming. Although monitoring was portrayed as time consuming, it was also regarded as vital in demonstrating
gitimacy and justifying present and future funding, particularly in the face of threats to funding and negative publicity, as
llows:
‘ . . . with people like the Arts Council, they want to know absolutely everything . . . as in most arts organisations, staff
are stretched; everybody does so many different roles. It can be a bit of a pain to do it, but that will really protect us now.’
(MM2)
Furthermore, monitoring data relating to audience size, geographical location and lifestyle was seen as very important in
egotiations with potential corporate donors where detailed performance data was required and it was seen as useful ‘to be
ble to talk in that language with them.’ (MM2)
The examples above suggest that similar to organisation 1, organisation 2 accepted accounting monitoring and we have
terpreted this as dialogic compliance. There were only a few negative comments relating to accounting monitoring. First,
e requirement to raise alternative funds through philanthropy was monitored through targets and this process was
erceived negatively as inappropriate for measuring long term effort. A sense of unfair pressure for MM2 was implied:
‘But it’s often a long-term game. It’s no smash and grab. It just doesn’t work that way, unfortunately. It’s not great when I
have targets that I need to meet.’
44 H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53Second, echoing organisation 1, organisation 2 resisted collecting data regarding ethnicity that they believed was
inappropriate, suggesting rebuttal.
5.5. Developing qualitative monitoring
Similar to organisation 1, organisation 2 had developed ways of gathering both quantitative and qualitative data to
demonstrate impact. A consortium of arts organisations was created and they attempted to assess economic impact and
intrinsic impact with the assistance of a consultant. The Intrinsic Impact Study included ‘collecting stories’ about the impact
of art experiences on people. The development and use of qualitative monitoring suggested reorientation through boundary
management. For example, the Intrinsic Impact Study was to be presented to the government as a form of lobbying
‘demonstrating how important the arts are to wellbeing and to society’ (MM1). Such an approach could potentially counter
the perpetual questioning of the value of the arts in national newspapers described by MM2. This type of constant
undermining of the arts threatened the lifeworld in a number of ways including potentially undermining self-conﬁdence,
even though arts organisations tried to resist its negative inﬂuence.
To conclude this section, whilst there was some resistance to the reductive, sometimes divisive roles of accounting
monitoring, in general, the monitoring role of accounting was fairly well accepted, particularly for advocacy. Acceptance was
often uncritical in organisation 2, as in organisation 1. We suggest that although monitoring may have included elements of
discursively benign colonisation, there was also a signiﬁcant level of false consciousness because organisation members did
not articulate much awareness of the broader, negatively colonising potential of accounting. We have therefore interpreted
the response to extensive monitoring as predominantly an example of dialogic compliance where interpretive schemes were
modiﬁed through ﬁnancial incentives.
6. Arts organisation 3
6.1. Background
According to the Marketing Director (MD, hereafter) of arts organisation 3, 60% of income was ‘earned’ through ticket
sales whilst 40% was ‘unearned’ and sourced mainly though Arts Council and City Council grants. Funding from trusts,
foundations and corporates was relatively small at about £350,000 per annum. The organisation runs a number of widening
engagement programmes and events. For example, members of the orchestra provided free instrumental tuition to children
in a deprived area of the city. Other widening engagement activities included inviting members of the general public to take
part in choral and orchestral concerts led by a professional conductor, performing well-known works alongside players from
the professional orchestra. A “Young Musician’s Pass” was available to children under 18 who lived in the city and played a
musical instrument, allowing them to attend concerts at a signiﬁcantly discounted fee. There was a large community care
project associated with mental health.
6.2. Austerity and uncertainty
Initially, the organisation was expecting funding cuts of 10% (forewarned by the Arts Council) and it was thought that they
would not affect the organisation signiﬁcantly. However, it gradually became apparent to the organisation that funding cuts
would be deeper than expected. Similar to organisations 1 and 2, the ﬁnancial austerity discourse created uncertainty
amongst the staff that intensiﬁed when the level of funding cuts became clearer. It was expected that the funding gap would
be met by new external funding sources including trusts and foundations.
6.3. Coping with austerity: the colonisation of fundraising
The severity of the funding cuts intensiﬁed the organisation’s emphasis on fundraising. The colonisation of fundraising
included employing separate individuals for personal, corporate and trust fundraising and a part-time administrator. In
addition, there was an attempt to try to change the culture within the organisation to a U.S. model, emphasising fundraising
at every level:
‘We’re trying to instil fundraising holistically throughout the organisation . . . Also on a directorate level, because
especially in the U.K., directors in individual areas haven’t necessarily seen fundraising as part of their remit because in
the States people just have had to understand that fundraising is a part of everybody’s job.’ (MD)
The impact of funding cuts was not contained, but permeated the organisation through the attempt to stimulate a culture
of fundraising throughout the organisation. This suggested a mock obedience with the potential for real coercive
colonisation (changing interpretive schemes) since marketisation was increasingly undermining the core values of the
organisation as it accepted responsibility to become increasingly self-ﬁnancing.
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Similar to organisation 2, attempts were made to resist excessive commercialisation suggesting reorientation through
oundary management. Thus, programming decisions were seen as a balance of commercial and artistic goals:
‘It’s a balance . . . I don’t think we could be completely commercial . . . because then we wouldn’t achieve some of the
artistic goals that we have for ourselves. We wouldn’t be going on tours. We wouldn’t be performing at the proms. So, you
can’t just be completely commercially driven. That’s a different type of orchestra.’ (MD)
Echoing organisation 2, the increasing emphasis by the government on philanthropy was portrayed as problematic for
imilar reasons of lack of philanthropic culture, inadequate tax incentives and lack of wealth in the region. Whilst they had
eceived sponsorship from a few large corporations historically, the MD thought that it was difﬁcult to obtain funds from
orporates:
‘ . . . there’s less interest among the corporates than you think. They kind of just see it as another corporate hospitality
opportunity that’s being sold to them.’
There was a sense of frustration with the lack of support from corporates, expressed by the MD as follows:
‘You wouldn’t believe the amount of effort, the number of conversations we might have with a corporate over a ticket
package worth a couple of thousand pounds. These are investment banks where a couple of thousand pounds is what they
spend on their dinner with the client, it’s nothing.’
The ambiguity of criticising corporate fundraising whilst continuing to develop it, suggested mock obedience to the
olonising pressures of austerity. The MD thought that it would be particularly difﬁcult to attract funds because the
rganisation was not directly involved in enhancing social welfare. She implied a belief that the value of the arts was being
ndermined in society by constant comparisons between the arts and other “more worthy” causes. This may have been one
f the reasons why organisations 2 and 3 both expressed the view that the legitimacy of their organisation needed to be
onstantly emphasized.
.5. Colonisation of monitoring
Similar to organisations 1 and 2, monitoring had a fairly prominent role in the organisation. The driving force
nderpinning the marketing department was reported as ‘meeting ﬁnancial targets and not so much about widening
ngagement’. The MD indicated that accounting bureaucracy did not interfere with her primary role of audience
evelopment:
‘There’s not a lot of bureaucracy in much of what I have to do on a day to day basis.’
However, she observed that there was a signiﬁcant amount of accountability within the organisation including measuring
ercentages of ﬁrst time attenders each month, percentages of people coming from outside the area, the general number of
ckets sold and income take:
‘ . . . the performance indicators are usually pretty straightforward and easily attained because we’re measuring stuff all
the time.’
Similar to organisations 1 and 2, providing information for monitoring purposes had become taken for granted in
rganisation 3.
Sales targets tended to increase year on year as a result of the demands of the funders. Although there was no system of
erformance related pay, sales targets provided accountability for staff, as follows:
‘I’m judged, and everyone else on the team is judged. One of the main criteria is are we reaching the bottom line each year
in terms of what our sales targets are for performances?’ (MD)
No major criticisms of the current target-driven assessment system were expressed, although the MD said that she
ished it included performance related pay to ﬁnancially reward the targets that she had achieved.
In general, there was an uncritical acceptance of accounting monitoring (as in organisations 1 and 2). In some cases this
ay have indicated false consciousness because organisation members did not articulate awareness of the broader,
egatively colonising potential of accounting monitoring. In other cases it could suggest pragmatic acquiescence or
agacious conformity. Such behaviour suggested dialogic compliance where interpretive schemes were modiﬁed to some
egree.
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This section draws the ﬁndings together, identiﬁes similar ﬁndings in organisations 4 and 5, and highlights the resonance
of these ﬁndings for arts organisations more widely. It discusses the managers’ perceptions of austerity, how they coped with
austerity, how monitoring was regarded as unproblematic, how accounting colonisation was resisted and how a disciplinary
regime was re-created. It then examines the lack of rationality, legitimation or motivation crises in the face of ﬁnancial crisis.
The extent of accounting colonisation is discussed as a continuum of colonisation, and signs of accounting colonisation are
identiﬁed.
7.1. Perceptions of austerity
The discourse of austerity and funding cuts was portrayed as much more problematic and colonising than accounting
monitoring. All organisations in the study had experienced some cuts, and the discourse was associated with a pressurised
environment involving a number of negative impacts including uncertainty and short-termism. For example, in the case of
organisation 1, it was reported that uncertainty in relation to funding made planning difﬁcult and it was hard to know
whether to continue to develop projects such as the learning disabled and Alzheimer’s projects. A short-term, reactive
approach to planning was reported:
‘We’re thinking much more short-term, because of the funding situation than I think we would otherwise have been
doing’ (AM2).
Funding cuts were associated with anxiety. For example, organisation 2 had lost a million pounds towards a building
refurbishment when the Coalition government disbanded the Regional Development Agency. Although alternative funds
were attracted, the sense of anxiety remained:
‘We really felt it was the Coalition government getting rid of the regional development agencies . . . We’re ﬁrmly back on
track now, but it’s through no help of the Coalition government in any way. And as far as I can see, it’s only going to get
worse. These cuts-we don’t know where they’re going to cut next.’ (MM2)
As discussed in Section 4.2, organisation 1 noted how funding cuts destroyed inter-organisational relationships that had
been built up over a number of years. Organisation 1 reported job loss and increased workload. According to AM1, funding
was cut internally by 54% in the widening engagement budget which meant losing a member of the widening engagement
group. This created increased workload for the team and problems for future strategy and development. Organisation 5 also
reported increased workload and an increase in casualisation.
Austerity was associated with frustration and ‘worry’ in organisation 1 and the general sense of organisational and
individual insecurity conveyed by all ﬁve organisations is illustrated in the quotation below through the image of the almost
random ‘falling axe’ of cuts in the following quotation:
‘I think the consultation that’s happened has been just a token and happened afterwards. It’s felt very much like a falling
axe without much thought for what will happen afterwards.’ (MM2, organisation 2)
The quotation above indicates that organisation 2 regarded the government approach to consultation regarding austerity
as tokenistic. Indeed, the government approach to funding cuts was presented as unfair, echoing sentiments hinted at by
other organisations.
‘Well some places had such a horriﬁc time, and some places that have got fantastic reputations and . . . they have great
artistic work, great audience ﬁgures, and the funding is just gone and it’s very difﬁcult to work out how these decisions
have been made.’ (MM2, organisation 2)
Funding cuts affected organisations in a variety of ways. Whilst the quotation above indicates that some arts activities
were lost, others such as youth work, outreach and less commercial orchestral performances were portrayed as under threat
in organisations 1–3.
7.2. Austerity coping strategies
Several organisations observed that seeking alternative funding was problematic in an increasingly competitive market.
For example, organisation 4 commented on the time consuming nature of project bids:
‘Arts funding is getting tough. We’ve had our council money cut. Our Arts Council money stayed the same but not
compensating for inﬂation. We’re in a hard position . . . We’re in a really good position because the collaboration team
here has a long and distinguished record of delivering projects, but it’s a competitive market. We worked for one [bid]
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(M1)
Whilst seeking alternative funds through philanthropy was described as difﬁcult by organisations 2 and 3, problematising
usterity was linked to a discourse of resilience that included ﬁnding new funding partners and adapting existing areas of
xpertise to new areas that was evident in all ﬁve organisations.
Zan et al. (2000) observe that arts managers are in the difﬁcult position of trying to mediate opposing cultures of
esthetics and management. Similarly, the managers in our study were in the ambiguous position of having to ﬁlter
onﬂicting objectives of government agencies and artists. In Habermasian terms, they were required to promote the system
nd reconcile it with the lifeworld. Consequently, austerity and funding cuts were also associated with ambiguous and role
onﬂicted behaviour characteristic of coercive and instrumental colonisation. For example, in organisation 1, the
iscontinuation of youth projects was presented both as a ‘shame’ and in contrast as an opportunity that ‘works well all
ound’, suggesting a movement from devious compliance towards dialogic compliance, where interpretive schemes were
eginning to change. Organisation 2 managers revealed morally ambiguous behaviour in conﬂict with their organisational
feworld when they publicly underplayed sector funding cuts, thus suggesting devious compliance arising from publicly
nded incentives. In organisation 3, the funding cuts triggered an appeal by the organisation to the general public for funds.
uch an appeal had never been undertaken in the history of the organisation, and appeared at odds with the image of the
rganisation as a traditional, stable institution. Through coercive colonisation, the discourse of austerity forced this
ncharacteristic, contradictory behaviour. We interpreted this radical change in organisational behaviour in organisation 3
s suggesting real obedience accompanied by changes to interpretive schemes in the face of coercive austerity.
We observed some similarities between the effects of austerity and Cushen’s (2013) observations of effects of
nancialization, budget cuts and re-organisations in the private sector such as employee insecurity, distress and the
nactment of falsely optimistic behaviours. Similar to the current study, negative consequences of decisions were referred to
nly as ‘challenges’ (see Cushen, 2013, p. 326) by organisation members, and overt resistance was limited. However, the
isengagement and work avoidance of some employees in the private sector observed by Cushen (2013) was not evidenced
 the current study where the arts managers expressed a strong sense of commitment to promoting the arts and widening
rts engagement in line with some of the key objectives of funding bodies. The commitment is exempliﬁed by the following
omment by AM1 (organisation 1):
‘Basically we all work really hard and are all very committed. It’s more than a day job for everybody. Flexible and
adaptable are watchwords in our team, but I think it is just really important to be like that in the arts generally . . . There’s
too many groups in the world that have no access at all, that really it’s frustrating because you feel that you could do so
much more.’
.3. Unproblematic Monitoring
All ﬁve organisations presented accounting in the form of data collection and monitoring as relatively unproblematic,
uggesting dialogic compliance. For example, in organisation 1, monitoring was presented as automatic and also rather
ddictive. In addition, data collection was regarded as very useful as a way of monitoring staff from a distance and it was
eported as motivating junior staff because senior managers used annual participation ﬁgures to appraise junior staff:
‘I think once you get into this [monitoring] it’s quite hard to stop. Because . . . I want to know what age groups we’ve been
working with . . . because I’m not directly delivering it . . . so in order for me to have a picture of our programme as a
manager, I need to know all that really . . . a lot of the data we’ve collected, it’s just useful . . . I know that probably why
we’ve started collecting it in the ﬁrst place is because we had to start ﬁlling in these boxes on these forms every quarter.
But we’ve got into a system of doing it now, which means it’s actually easy enough to do most of the time.’ (AM1,
organisation 1)
Organisation 2 typiﬁes the taken for granted nature of accounting colonisation and the legitimising role of accounting
at could be clearly discerned in all the organisations:
‘I think most organisations that are funded publicly are so careful to record everything they do. It’s just ingrained now. It’s
been the way for so many years and the way that you report. But I think that we are even more careful now because it’s
such a time of change and we have to justify ourselves.’ (MM2)
Similarly, organisation 5 was incentivised to demonstrate economic impact and highlighted quantitative data reporting
s a strength, thus suggesting dialogic compliance:
‘Economic impact is probably something that we’ve perhaps been a bit stronger on thinking about, because we’ve had
European funding and funders have been quite interested in those kind of arguments, so we’ve become quite good at
being able to talk about our visitor economy impact.’ (HM)
In regard to monitoring, all ﬁve organisations reported extensive use and acceptance of quantitative monitoring, and it
as generally portrayed as benevolent, contributing to a range of organisational objectives, including enhancing advocacy,
ccountability to the funders and the public, internal control and helping to facilitate performance measurement internally
48 H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53and to gain further funds. The following comment from organisation 2 emphasises the main role for accounting expressed by
all ﬁve organisations as vital to the organisation to gain funding:
‘ . . . we can’t access this funding unless we can absolutely demonstrate the positive impact that it’s having on people’s
lives.’ (MM2)
We have suggested that organisations demonstrated a form of false consciousness, pragmatic acquiescence or sagacious
conformity by voicing minimal criticisms of accounting monitoring. For example, they seemed unaware of negative effects of
performance indicators on their lifeworld by diverting them from more important core activities, or some may have thought
that it was futile to voice dissent or considered it contrary to the organisation’s interests. Their primary response was
therefore one of dialogic compliance where they uncritically accepted accounting monitoring and its beneﬁts, whilst some of
its rituals, ceremonies and myths secretly eroded their interpretive schemes. Dillard (2002) found that apathy, ignorance and
fear can inﬂuence the extent of managerial colonisation in accounting departments of U.S. universities. In our study of arts
organisations, ignorance and fear were inﬂuential on the degree of colonisation, but the presence of funding incentives was
also signiﬁcant. Funding acted as an incentive to accept both accounting monitoring and existing power relations,
engendering dialogic and devious compliance. Within a general climate of insecure funding, current levels of accounting
monitoring were taken for granted, perhaps because the organisations in this study were relatively large compared with
others in the sector and their funding was more secure in relative terms, particularly if they continued to practice accounting
monitoring. In addition, their compliance may have been linked to a strong lifeworld where preservation of core activities
was regarded as paramount, as indicated for example in the quote relating to level of commitment in organisation 1 in
Section 7.2.
Discourses of accounting monitoring were more accepted in the organisations in this study and more intrusive than in
Broadbent and Laughlin’s (1998) study of schools and G.P. practices where accounting colonisation was resisted and
absorbed by specialist work groups leaving core values unaffected. In addition, the notion of private sector funding was more
readily accepted in the arts organisations in the current study than in the English National Health Service observed by
Broadbent and Laughlin (2013). A key reason for the different responses to monitoring and private funding may have been
because the funding of the arts organisations was generally less stable with less public support than the funding of schools, G.
P. practices and the National Health Service, rendering resistance and non-conformity less likely in arts organisations. As a
funding manager in the City Council observed, organisations not able to complete monitoring procedures would be excluded
or marginalised in the arts sector, thus illustrating the colonising and divisive role of accounting.
The organisations in this study welcomed accounting monitoring for advocacy purposes, but scarcely discussed its
controlling role on their organisation, perhaps reﬂecting how powerful elites do not want the rationality of accounting to be
questioned because it potentially undermines their authority (Dillard & Yuthas, 2006). This is supported by Selwood (2002)
who found that the questioning of impact measurement was not encouraged in the arts sector and was regarded as
politically sensitive. Echoing this ﬁnding, the managers interviewed seemed reluctant to criticise funders. For example, the
Arts Council and the City Council were described as ‘fair’ in their management of funding cuts by MM2 (organisation 2) and it
was acknowledged that the City Council had faced ‘huge cuts’. Thus, arts organisations in this study may not have wished to
be perceived as the non-compliant, “problematic” organisations (described in consultant reports) that apparently eschewed
accounting and the business ethos. In addition, the arms-length funding system may have helped to defuse any dissent.
Similar to the study of museums by Oakes et al. (1998), in accepting the importance of sales targets, participation hours,
number of attendees etc., the arts organisations in this study complied with the analogy of their organisation as a business in
competition with other arts and event providers. Furthermore, as Oakes et al. (1998) observe, in complying with the view
that the organisation is similar to a business, the claim for public funding is undermined. Thus, in accepting private sector
accounting monitoring to maintain funding, the arts organisations ironically contributed to potential constraints on publicly
funded activities.
The consent to accounting monitoring by arts managers may have been fuelled in part by funders emphasizing that the
data collected was used mainly for advocacy. In addition, acceptance may have been fostered by the government allowing
limited autonomy and some ﬂexibility around the margins (discussed in Section 7.5) regarding what information could be
provided, resulting from its contradictory role of both maintaining and reducing the public sector and reﬂecting accounting’s
contribution towards ‘regulated freedom’ (Miller & Rose, 2010, p. 53). Consequently, arts managers believed that they could
use quantitative and qualitative monitoring to their own advantage. The fostering of limited autonomy is one of the general
characteristics of management accounting observed by Miller (2001) that helps to render it potentially an effective mode of
governing. Thus, devolved budgets or allowing modiﬁcation to modes of accountability provide a degree of freedom within
broader economic constraints and responsibility that reduces the potential for resistance.
7.4. Resisting accounting colonisation
Despite the constant undermining of the lifeworld of arts organisations by external institutions, and evidence of its
erosion through monitoring and austerity, some attempts were made to try and maintain core values of promoting quality
art to as wide an audience as possible in all ﬁve organisations. For example, although organisation 3 had ﬁnancial difﬁculties,
it stated that it aimed to preserve its balance of commercial and non-commercial programming, demonstrating
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rganisation 2 strove to retain some low ticket prices to maintain accessibility. Organisation 1 resisted excessive
ommercialism by refusing to rent out its spaces to commercial organisations, demonstrating a rebuttal of accounting
olonisation. Despite isolated and uncoordinated attempts at resistance, austerity and monitoring insidiously affected core
alues through their associated ideology, through ongoing critique of the value of the arts and through extensions of their
ractices into managerial and organisational activities.
.5. Resisting and re-creating disciplinary regimes
As indicated in organisation 1, managers accepted that funders needed to be able to demonstrate accountability. In
isplaying dialogic compliance, the extract below reveals how managers typically regarded monitoring as valuable if it
ould:
‘ . . . improve a project and improve an organisation and be able to get you more money or be able to articulate about the
project matter and be able to support the participants and the artists involved’ (organisation 4, Manager 1).
However, a few criticisms of the inability of quantitative measurement to capture the value of their work were reported,
articularly by organisations 1 and 4. For example, referring to quantitative performance measurement, organisation 4
eported:
‘The other pressure is because . . . they need something concrete that’s quantiﬁable . . . but our projects don’t always
work like that . . . just because of the nature of the work we do; it’s very intense and it’s very full of fun . . . for example,
it isn’t as if you’re in a doctors, you couldn’t say “do you feel better since you were given that drug?” It just doesn’t work
like that . . . ’ (Manager 2).
In observing a few reductive and divisive aspects of monitoring, the organisations demonstrated some ambiguity in their
esponses to quantitative monitoring characteristic of coercive and instrumental colonisation.
Organisations 1, 2 and 4 attempted to resist the colonisation of reductive accounting monitoring by creating
ansformations of accounting to try to make it serve their purposes through a range of narrative and visual media. As well as
sing various forms of accounting to market and legitimise their activities, organisations 1and 4 reported using new forms of
ccounting as part of a reﬂexive process of learning, attempting continuous improvement. The qualitative evaluations
evised by organisation 1 were infused with self-motivation, and represented an expression of autonomy in the face of
ccounting colonisation. Members of organisation 1 created their own very challenging monitoring procedures. The
onitoring procedures may have arisen from their lifeworld that included norms of ‘commitment’ and regarded art and
ocial work as ‘more than a day job’. The new form of monitoring represented a reorientation that attempted to protect
terpretive schemes and core activities. It transcended conventional monitoring, supporting the concept of a ‘reversal’ of
olonisation discussed in Habermas and Nielsen (1990) where the norms of the lifeworld can invade steering media such as
ccounting numbers. The qualitative monitoring was so challenging that the organisational members, in trying to assert
eir own autonomy over accounting, paradoxically intensiﬁed their own subjugation. Organisational members re-created
e discipline ethic of accounting logic in a different form. Similarly, Miller (2001, p. 393) observes that ‘even when
dividuals seek to subvert or avoid the calculations made of them, their actions still take place in reference to an economic
orm based on accounting numbers’. In this way, individuals created self-regulation as part of the governmentality of liberal
apitalism. The creation of new forms of accounting illustrates Clegg’s (1994, p. 308) Foucauldian view that power and
esistance may ‘creatively produce’ one another. Thus, the environment of accounting, economic rationality and accounting
gic shapes the form that resistance takes and vice versa.
.6. Lack of Habermasian crises
Habermas (2007) argues that, despite endemic ﬁnancial crises, a full system crisis in advanced liberal capitalism will not
ccur, partly because the administration and the welfare-state ﬁlter out the worst effects. Similarly, in our case study in the
ftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, we observed the DCMS and the Arts Council protecting a number of arts organisations
om dissolution by administering selective and relatively limited funding reductions. In addition, Habermas (2007) suggests
at in modern advanced capitalism, technological and economic rationality are entrenched and almost beyond question,
miting the possibility of system crisis. Similarly, we identiﬁed the taken for granted entrenchment of economic rationality
 accounting technologies in arts organisations. Habermas (2007) explains that although a system crisis may be averted,
gitimation crisis tendencies or secondary conﬂicts may arise from the grassroots in place of a total system crisis. We
bserved sublimated legitimation crisis tendencies in arts organisations which had avoided the full effects of austerity that
ok the form of unnatural displacement behaviours where organisations sometimes acted out of character. For example,
rganisation 2 demonstrated role conﬂict in its television appearance and organisation 3 made an uncharacteristic appeal for
ublic funds. In addition, criticisms of philanthropy in organisations 2 and 3 suggested minor legitimation crisis tendencies.
50 H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53Habermas (2007) argues that motivation crises can precipitate a full legitimation crisis and he observes embryonic
motivation crises in post-auratic art and youth subcultures arising from long-term changes to traditions. Since funding cuts
were not discursively agreed by communicative action in arts organisations, Habermasian theory might predict some
evidence of motivation crisis tendencies. However, we observed that fear and uncertainty associated with austerity
suppressed counter-culture responses in managers to the point where they were barely noticeable. The power of fear and
uncertainty may contribute towards a more general explanation of why subcultures have not expanded or precipitated
motivation crises and emancipatory change in the way Habermas (2007) suggests.
7.7. The continuum of colonisation
Turning to our research question regarding the colonisation of funding issues and the nature and extent of accounting
colonisation in arts organisations, we identiﬁed many different and subtle forms of colonisation. Fig. 1 summarises our
observations of the degrees of accounting and austerity colonisation along a continuum from relatively socially undesirable
(real obedience) through to devious compliance. Fig. 2 summarises our observations of resistance to accounting and
austerity as an extension of this continuum from reorientation through boundary management to rebuttal. Discursively
benign colonisation is not included in the ﬁgures because, as an idealised form, it is not is not present in the study.
In comparing organisations 1–3 that have been the main focus of our analysis, it is clear that all three organisations were
severely colonised by funding issues. Organisation 3 was most colonised by funding issues and least critical of accounting.
Although accounting was taken for granted in all ﬁve of the organisations, like a pathogenic invasion, the inﬁltration of
accounting was uneven with a variety of effects along a continuum. The nature of accounting colonisation theory couched in
terms of Habermas’ (1989) military invasion metaphor and changes to interpretive schemes may lead us to search for
dramatic effects to identify colonisation. However, pathological accounting colonisation may not always be easy to
recognise, particularly because repressive systems ﬁnd ways of limiting critique and obscuring harmful arrangements so that
they become normalised. In the current study, we observed a number of key indicators that when taken together may
suggest accounting and austerity colonisation. These included expressions of negative emotions (e.g. worry and frustration)
and contradictory statements or behaviour in relation to the uncertainty of potential funding cuts, divisive and unexplained
funding allocations, the presence of a considerable amount of accounting, a naive acceptance of accounting with few reports
of its limitations, senior managers’ optimistic belief that they have absorbed or contained accounting and protected core
activities, senior managers’ unawareness of the extent of the power and implications of accounting, and the use of divisive
performance indicators favouring certain types of art work such as one-off events to large audiences. The context of lack of
support for public funding of the arts from a signiﬁcant section of the public and critical external reports by certain groups
within the arts sector (advocating an increased business and accounting orientation) were also signiﬁcant in fostering
accounting and austerity colonisation. We suggest that as well as dramatic behaviour, a range of subtle, ambiguous and
nuanced behaviour can indicate pathological accounting and austerity colonisation. Similarly, resistance can be indicated by
both dramatic and subtle behaviour.
8. Conclusions
Although the managers were unaware of the extent of the constitutive roles of accounting, they knew the numbers were
inadequate and could not fully capture the value of the arts. Yet, they played out the charade of advocacy and legitimacy,
claiming to demonstrate impact when they knew the essence of the arts is always out of reach. Thus, the managers and
funders were actors in a play of advocacy, adding their own creative act to the creative activities of the actors and artists they
supported. In addition, we found that the arts lifeworld was not pure as suggested by Habermasian theory, but was already
colonized and corrupted by accounting. The arts sector was already part-commercialised, reﬂecting the notion that system
and lifeworld are generally intertwined (Oakes & Berry, 2009), and the shock of austerity and funding cuts pushed the sector
further into the embrace of accounting towards the illusion that it could act entirely as their friendly, innocuous advocate.
Insecurity and fear were particularly signiﬁcant in encouraging the desire to maintain or extend accounting, rather than
fostering rationality or legitimation crises. There was little evidence of the seeds of a motivation crisis in the face of ﬁnancial
crisis as predicted by Habermasian theory. Thus, ﬁnancial crisis triggered an intensiﬁcation of accounting colonisation rather
than a wave of critique and resistance.
Whilst many aspects of accounting monitoring were reported as useful and its presence was taken for granted, this
research has proposed that accounting monitoring and the discourses and practices of austerity and budgetary controls were
extremely divisive, affecting vulnerable groups disproportionately and eroding important areas of widening engagement
and innovative practice. The reported inappropriateness of quantitative measures suggests that increasing such measures of
impact may not be very helpful in assessing the contribution of some arts organisations to arts engagement. In addition, the
overburdening of arts organisations with an increase in either quantitative or qualitative monitoring may not be the most
effective use of funds in the short term in a climate of ﬁnancial austerity. Given the potentially destructive nature of
accounting colonisation, there is scope for further research to consider how and why it can occur in a variety of contexts in
arts organisations and whether it is associated with Habermasian crises. It is also important to develop further
understanding of the management of austerity and funding constraints in arts organisations. The potentially signiﬁcant
impact of accounting and austerity initiatives indicates the need for Habermasian democratic involvement in budgetary
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Fig. 1. Continuum of accounting and austerity colonisation in arts organisations.
H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53 51
52 H. Oakes, S. Oakes / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 38 (2016) 34–53decisions and appropriately informed Habermasian democratic debate prior to any decision to further embed accounting
monitoring in arts organisations. The study shows how austerity is more threatening than accounting monitoring for large
arts organisations and how when the two are combined in the context of a rhetoric of extending business orientation,
accounting monitoring can become increasingly rampant and potent, whilst still being presented within the sector as
relatively harmless and useful for advocacy.
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